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Simple Mechanisms to Illlplelllent the 
Core of College Adrnissions Pro blelllS 
José Alcalde & Antonio Romero-Medina 
Abstract 
This paper provides three simple mechanisms to implement allocations 
in the core of matching markets. \Ve analyze sorne sequential rnechanisms 
which mimic matching procedures for many-to-one reallife matching mar-
kets. \Ve show that only cor,e allocations should be attained when agents 
act strategically faced váth these mechanisms. Two mechanisms implement 
the core correspondence in SPE, whereas the third implements the students· 
optimal stable solution. 
Keywords: College Admissions Problems. lvfechanism Design. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents mechanisms implementing stable allocations for matching 
rnarkets. We present three rules that mimic the sequential interaction holding 
between agents in contractual processes on both sides of the rnarket. 
11atching markets have been extensively anal:y'Zed from a game-theoretical 
point of view. (See Roth and Sotomayor [15] for a detailed state of the art until 
1990.) In this framework, Roth [12] and Alcalde and Barbera [3] ha"\;e sho~-n the 
existence of incentives for agents to misreport their true preferences when facéd 
v.rith sorne mechanisms selecting allocations to satisfy "desired~' properties. 
Sorne authors have concentrated on partial aspects derived from the strategic 
behavior of the agents. For instance, Gale and Sotomayor [7] and Roth [13] 
analyzed partial implementation of the core in a marriage market frarnev.rork. 
Alcalde [1] analyzes a particular case of matching problems called the marriage 
rnarket. He tackles the implementability of two particular solution concepts: the 
core correspondence and its extreme selections, and provides positive ans'\vers. 
In college admissions problerns~ the general model \ve are interested in~ Kara 
/' 
and Sonmez [9] show that the core correspondence can be implemented in l\ash 
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equilibria. Nevertheless, they do not provide a simple mechanism '\\~hich can be 
employed in reallife situations. They also show that no subselection of the core 
is Nash implementable. 
In a related framework, Romero-:tvledina [11] studies the mechanism employed 
by the Spanish University system to allocate ne\v students to colleges. He shows 
that this mechanism can select lmstable out comes but, when students act strate-
gically, only core allocations should be reached. The matching procedure studied 
by Romero-Medina does not allow universities to act strategie ally. For this rea-
son, his results cannot be applied to the more general frame\vork in V\"hich we are 
interested. Thus designing a useful mechanism to implement stable solutions for 
job markets is still an open problem. 
An interesting feature of the mechanisms we present, is that they constitute 
reasonable proposals for effective designo Following Jackson [8], the mechanisms 
used to implement social choice correspondences should have ~~natural'~ features. 
A way to argue 'when a mechanism is natural is presented by the possibility of 
being employed in reallife situations. We are going to introduce rules employed 
in real many-to-one matching markets. For instance~ the rule to be introduced in 
Section 5 is used by the Spanish Public Administrations to allocate the '\vorkers 
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they hire. 1 
This paper provides some mechanisms irnplementing core allocations. The 
rules to be analyzed capture sorne aspects 'which hold in reallife college admissions 
problems. Firstly, we model sequential interactions among agents on both sides of 
the market, reflecting an adjustment process to reach stable allocations. Secondly, 
agents on one side of the market adopt an ~'active" role, making offers~ whereas 
the aptitude shO'wn by agents on the other side can be considered as ~~passive~': 
they only accept or reject the offers they receive. In fact, the mechanisms analyzed 
below reflect the idea of the classical Gale and Shapley algorithm. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic 
model. Sections 3 and 4 present two mechanisms to implement the core for job 
markets in SPE. Section 5 proposes a family of mechanisms implementing a selec-
tion of the core, namely the students' optimal stable matching. Conclusions are 
collected in Section 6. 
2. The model 
Let e = {C1,"" en} and S = {81,"" sm} be the set of colleges and students. 
respectively. Each college has preferences P (c) over the set of groups of students. 
1 We are grateful to Carmen Herrero for pointing out this aspect. 
7 
P (e) is assumed to be a linear order on 2s. Each student~s preferences P (8) is 
described by a linear order on e u {s}. A college admissions problem is ful1y 
described by a triplet {e, Si f}' where f= {P (c¡) , ... , P (en) ,P (81), ... , P (Sm)} 
is a list containing a full description of the agents' preferences and is called a 
profile. 
An allocation for such a problem, or matching~ is a mapping Ji froID C U S into 
28 U C satisfying 
(i) for all e E C, ¡.t(e) E 28 , 
(ii) for all s E S, ¡..t(s) E e U {s}, and 
(iii) for eacp pair (e, s) E C x S, [pes) = e ~ s E p(e)]. 
From no~r on "re will consider e and S to be fi.."'Ced sets, thus ,ve can identify 
a colleges admissions problem {F, Wi f} "ith the preference profile f. 2 Let 
M (f) be the set of all possible matchings J1 in f. Finally, ~ denotes the set of 
(potential) matching markets. 
Let !: be a matching market. Given a set of students .. 4 e S. ,ve denote by 
Chc(.4) the P(c) maximal element on 204• 
2For the sake of simplicity, we will employ the same notation for preference profiles the and 
college admissions problem. The conte:x.-t will be made precise if P denotes a matching problem 
or simply a preference profile. 
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Definition 2.1. A matching J-l is said to be indi\~idually rational for!! ifI 
(i) Che(J-l(e» = J-l(e) for aH e E C, and 
(ii) for all s ES, e E C [sP(s)e ===} s rj. J-l(e)]. 
Definition 2.2. Let J-l be a matching for p. We say that J..L is blocked by a pair 
"" 
( e, s) E C x S iff 
(i) e pes) J-l(s), and 
(ii) s E Che (J..L(e) U {s}). 
A pair (e, s) which satisfies the aboye two conditions is called a blocking pair 
for J-l. 
Definition 2.3. Let J.l be a matching for f. lVe say that f1 is (pair-\ri~~) stable 
if it is individually rational and there is no pajr blocking it. Let e (.f) be the set 
) 
of stable allocations for the problem p. 
V\ 
FinaHy, we as sume that colleges' preferences with regard to groups of students 
are substitutive. That is, for any two students s and s' if oS belóngs to Che (.A.). 
then she 'will also belong to Che(A \ {S'}). This assumption is quite usual in the 
literature and guarantees non-emptiness of the set of stable allocations. (A.lcalde 
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[2] provides further arguments in favour of the need of such an assumption.) :\otice 
that 'when preferences are substitutive, the set of (pair-wise) stable allocations 
coincides 'with the core of the related colleges admission problem. That is. given 
a stable allocation, no group of agents can find a matching to improve the utility 
of all its members 'without being matched with agents outside this group. 
The concept of implementation we are going to use throughout the paper is 
well-knO'wn in the literature. We next formalize this for both the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium (SPE) and the strong subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPE) 
cases. Let E k be the set of strategies for agent k and let E = x Ex be the set 
xECUS 
of strategy profiles. Associated to each strategy profile e we can define a message 
profile m (e), or simply m, wruch describes the action taken by each individual 
when the agents choose such strategies. A matching mechanism is described 
by the set of strategies allowed to each agent, and an outcome function ')' that 
assigns a matching to each profile of messages. We say that a matching mechanism 
implements a solution concept, say X, in (strong) subgame perfect Nash equilibria 
if (i) for any e, (strong) su bgame perfect equilibrium of the game r = { e, S; f; ')} 
')' (m (e)) belongs to X (f) and (ii) for each J1 in X (f) there exists a (strong) 
SPE for f, say e', such that I (m (e')) = /-L. 
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3. The "colleges-propose-and-students-choose" mechanism 
This section is devoted to analysing a matching mechanism that mimics matching 
procedures which hold in real life. The mechanism we are going to introduce is 
simple in the following sense. The message space of each agent can be straight-
forwardly obtained from its own preferences. The outcome function can be very 
easily evaluated at any profile of messages. Thus~ any individual is able to evalu-
ate the consequences of her strategy Vv;thout using a sophisticated analysis of the 
mechanism. 
We next introduce a mechanism to implement the core correspondence in SPE. 
\Ve are going to employ a natural two-stage game form mechanism. In the first 
stage each college makes proposals to a set (possibly empty) of students. In the 
second stage each student chooses the college she prefers. The outcome of the 
game is a matching where by each student is enrolled by the college she selected 
whenever she has received a proposal from this college. 
110re formally, in the first stage, colleges have to decide simultaneously. Each 
college message space coincides '\vith the set of potential teams of students. 28 . In 
the second stage students, lmowing the colleges' messages. select simultaneously 
the college in which they 'want to study. Thus, each student message space coin-
11 
cicles 'with e u {s}. Let m (k) denote the message by agent k E e u 5'. and iñ be 
an ordered vector containing the messages of all the agents. 
The outcome function, denoted by ~CS, selects a matching '\vhich is defined 
as follows: 
~cs (1ñ) = ¡..tiñ, \vhere for any s in S, 
{ 
m(s) 
J.tm (s) = s 
if s E m (In ( s ) ) 
otherwise 
and, for each e in e, 
¡..tiñ (e) = {s E In (e) le = m (s)} 
Theorem 3.1. The mechanism described aboye implements in SPE the core cor-
respon den ce. 
Proof. First, we prove that every SPE out come is in e (!'). Let m be a SPE3 
for res := {e, S;!'; q,es}. One can check that, at the second stage, each student 
s has a dominant strategy, namely m' (s) = arg max P( s) on {e E e s. t. .s E 'In' (e)} U 
3Strictly speaking, m/ is the ordered vector of messages that result in a subgame perfect 
equilibrium. \Ve abuse on the notation throughout the paper identifying messages at a SPE 
with subgame perfect equilibria. 
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{s}. Thus, <I>es (in') should be an individually rational matching for f. 
Let us suppose that .;pes (iñ' ) is not in e (f)' then there should be a blocking 
pair, say (e, s) in C x S. Since a11 the colleges play simultaneously. this can 
not be the case, because co11ege e can reach higher utility by playing 'In." ( e) = 
Che (J.lrn/ (e) U {s}). Notice that, at the second stage the message stated by student 
s has to be mil (s) = e. A contradiction. 
On the other hand, let J.l be a stable matching for p. Let us consider the 
follo'\\ring strategies for the agents. Each college message (and strategy) is 1n( e) = 
J.l (e). At the second stage any student's strategy is her dominant strategy. Thus, 
her message is m( s) = J.l (8). It is very easy to see that this constitutes a SPE 
for the related game ~hose outcome coincides '\\ith J.l~ which yields the desired 
resulto • 
The solution concept we implemented involves a high level of cooperation 
among agents. For this reason one is tempted tú analyze the consequences of 
agents cooperation ,\\yhen faced with our mechanism. As Example 3.2 show·s~ 
cooperation among agents does not reduce the set of out comes one can expect. 
Example 3.2. Let consider the follow'ing nve students and three colleges market. 
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lt 1S straightforward to see that there is a strong subgame perfect lVash equi-
librium yielding each stable matching. For instance: the matching J.1s in '\v'hich 
student s, e(s) = argmaxP(s) on {e E e S.t. s E '1n(c)} U {s}: lvhere rn(c) is the 
message of college c. In a similar n,~ay, we can support the colleges' optimal stable 
each student s, e(s) = argmaxP(s) on {e E e S.t. s E 1n{c)} U {s}. 
4. The "students-propose-and-colleges-choose" mechanism 
This section introduces a second mechanism implementing the eore correspon-
dence of college admissions problems. The idea underlying this mechanism is 
very similar to the previous one. In this case offers are made by students and 
each college selects the best set of students~ from the proposals it receives. That 
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is, the main formal difference between this mechanism and the one studied in 
Section 3 is that ,ve shift the order in which agents on both sides of the market 
make their decisions. 
Let us introduce the mechanism. This is a two-stage game-form mechanism. 
In the first stage, students have to decide. Each student message space coincides 
'with the set of colleges and her being unmatched option, e u {s}. In the second 
stage, colleges which know students' messages, select the set of students that they 
want to admito Thus, each college's message space coincides "rith 2s. Let 1n (k) 
denote the message of agent k E e u S, and 1ñ be an ordered vector containing 
the messages of all the agents. 
The outcome function, denoted by ~sc, selects a matching 'which is defined 
as follO'ws: 
<;I>8C ( m) = J.Lm, where for any s in S, 
( 
m(s) 
11m (s) = s 
if s E m(1n(s)) 
otherw"ise 
and, for each e in e, 
J.Lrñ (e) = {s E 1n (e) le ~ ln (s)} 
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Theorem 4.1. The "students-propose-and-colleges-choose'; mechanism implements 
in SPE the core correspondence of college admissions problems. 
Proof First, we show that every SPE outcome is a st.able matching relative 
to agents' preferences. For, let m be a SPE for r Sc := {e, S; F.:; <I>SC}. One 
can check that, at the second stage, each college has a dominant. st.rategy~ namely 
m'(c) = Che ({s E SIc = m'(s)}). Thus, q,SC (m') should be an individually 
rational matching for p. 
'-'" 
Let us suppose that <I>sc (m') is not in e (F.: ), then there should be a blocking 
pair, say (c, s), in C x S. Since all the st.udents play simultaneously. this can 
not be the case, because student s can reach higher utility by playing 1n" (s) = c. 
Notice that, at the second stage c's message has to include such a student. A 
contradiction. 
On the other hand, let J-L be a stable matching for.f. Let us consider the 
following strategies for the agents. Each student message (and strategy) is 1n(s) = 
J-L (s). At the second stage any college's strategy is its dominant strategy. Its 
message is m(c) = J-L (e). It is very easy to see that this constitutes a SPE for the 
related game whose outcome coincides '\\~th J-L, whlch yields the desired resulto I 
Since the Social Choice Correspondence that ,ve study is the coreo we are 
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tempted to analyze the infiuence of agents' behavior on the expected outcome 
when their commitment is a110wed foro In such a case strong subgame :\ash 
equilibrium seems to be a minimal requirement to be fulfilled by onr predictions. 
The analysis of such an equilibrium concept is the aim of onr Theorem 4.2. 
Theorem 4.2. The students-propose-and-colleges-choose mechanism implements 
in SSPE the students optimal stable allocation. 
Proof First, we are going to show that the students' optimal stable matching 
can be supported by a SSPE. Let P be a matching market, and pS be its students' 
V\ 
optimal stable allocation. Consider the follO'wing strategies. For any s in S, 
e (8) = J.LS (8) and, for each e in C, e (e) = argmaxP (e) on {s E S s.t. e = e(8)}. 
As the reader can see these strategies constitute a SSPE whose outcome is Jis. 
On the other hand, let e' be a SSPE yielding p =1- J.Ls as outcome.. \Ve ,\TjIl 
show that it cannot be possible. Notice that every SSPE is a SPE. Thus, by 
Theorem 4.1, p has to be stable. Since J.L =1- J.Ls, there is a set of students, say 
S', preferring their mate under J.ls rather than that assigned to them by Ji. Let 
S' = {8 E 8 : J.LS (8) P (s) J.L (8)}. And consider the following strategies. For a11 s 
in S', e"(8} = J.LS (8), and any 8 in 8\S' plays her strategy e' (8). Because of the 
latticial structure of the core, it holds that e' (8) = pS (8) for a11 8 not in S' (Roth 
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and Sotomayor [15, Theorem 5.31]). Given that colleges play their dominant 
strategies (see proof of our Theorem 4.1 aboye), the outcome 1vhen agents in S' 
shift their strategy and play ell (s) yield JLs as outcome. A. contradiction. I 
5. The "students-sequentially-propose-and-colleges-choose" 
mechanism 
This section introduces a modified version of the '~students-propose-and-colleges­
choose" mechanism. The allocation rule that we are going to analyze differs from 
that studied in Section 4 because students' decisions are made sequentially. In 
fact, we are going to introduce a family of mechanisms (each for any different 
order in 'which students have to decide). Nevertheless the expected outcome does 
not depend on such an order. 
Conclusions of Theorem 3.1 do not remain valid 1\Then such a sequentiality is 
introduced in the mechanism. Theorem 5.1 shov."s that our capacity of prediction 
(v.Then no commitment is allowed) increases. The outcome 'we attáin is still stable, 
but no any stable outcome can be reached by a subgame perfect equilibrium of this 
mechanism. In fact, there is only one out come implemented by this mechanism. 
namely the optimal stable matching from the point of vie1V of students. 
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In sorne sense, the sequentiality (in students' dedsions) plays a role similar to 
the students ability to commit themselves to the strategies to be played. Because 
of the latticial structure of the core such a cornmitment '\villlead to the best stable 
allocation that students can reach. 
Let us introduce the rnechanisrn. First, fix the order in '\vhich students are 
going to play. 'iVithout loss of generality, let us assmne that SI is the first to play, 
S2 is the second and so on. This is a m+l stage game formo At stage i-th~ i = 1, 
... , ID, student Si selects a college. Thus, each student message space coincides 
with the set of colleges (and her being unmatched option). At stage m+1-th~ the 
last stage, colleges simultaneously select the set oí students they '\vant to admit, 
one set oí students for each college. Thus, each college rnessage space coincides 
'with 28 . Finally, the outc<?me function, denoted by epssc, selects the matching 
defined as follows: 
ep8sC (1ñ) = J.1iñ' where for any S in S, 
¡ m(s) Jiiñ (8) = 8 if S E m(m(s)) 
otherwise 
and, for each e in e, 
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J-liñ (e) = {s E m (e) le = 1n (s)} 
where m is a list containing a fun description of agents ~ messages. 
\Ve next state the main result for this section. The students-sequentially-
propose-and-colleges-choose mechanism implements in SPE the stable solution 
which is optirnal frorn the point of view oí students. 
Theorem 5.1. Let e be a SPE for r SsC := {e, S;!:; <'Psse }, and 1ñ be the vector 
of messages that agents state in e. Then Jliñ: = J-ls ~ the optimal stable allocation 
from the point of view of students. 
Proof. \Ve will proceed to show this result in a constructive "~rayo First. '\ve 
"rill present sorne properties that any SPE, has to satisfy. Then we '\vill argue that 
agents' messages willlead to the optimal students~ stable matching. 
In order to characterize the set of SPE, we ",-jll apply backward induction .. 4...t 
stage m+l-th, given students messages, each college e has a best response~ namely. 
'In* (e) = argrnaxP (e) on {s I 'In (s) = C}4. At stage m-th. given messages for 
4Notiee that such a strategy is not the unique best response. In faet~ the set of best responses 
for eollege e is the union of su eh a set with any set of students S' such that e =j:. m (s') for all 
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students other than Sm, (1ñ (SI) , ... , fu (Sm-l)), and kno\ving colleges~ behavior. 
this agent's best reply is 
1n* (Sm) = argmaxP (Sm) on 
{e I Sm E e he ( {s E S\ {sm} I fu ( s) = e} U {Sm} )} . 
Notice that such a message coincides with J..Ls (sm), when any student Si in S\ 
{Sm} has preferences such that m(si) is the only college v.thich is preferred to her 
being unmatched option5 , and P'(x) = P(x) for agents in 11' U {sm}. 
In order to apply an inductive argument, let the strategy of student Sk, rni (Sk) 
be defined in a recursive way by 1ñi (Sk) if k < i and 1n* (Sk) \vhenever k > i. Thus 
1n* (Si) = argmaxP (Si) on the set 
= J..LS (Si), when agents preferences are P'(x) = 1n(x) if x E S \ Uj>i {Sj} 
and P'(x) = P(x) otherwise. 
Finally, given messages that students other than SI have to be 'ln* (Si) = 
s' in S'. Neverthe1ess, aH these messages are strategicalIy equivalent. Since we are interested. in 
equilibrium payoffs rather thah equilibria strategies, we do not pay attention to these strategies. 
The same argument applies to the proof of Theorem 4.l. 
5For sil11plicity~ we identify student~ Si preferences with coHege Cj ~ i.e. P( Si) = Cj ~ whenever 
such a college is the on1y for which CjP(Si)Si holds. 
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J-LS (Wi), 'when agents' preferences are P*, where P* (x) = P (x) fol' all agent other 
'-'" 
than 81, the best option for sl.lch a student is 'In* (81) = J-LS (Wl)' '\vhen agents 
preferences are !:' their true preferences. I 
Remark 1 . .;"J:otice that in the proof the existence of a unique stable matching 
which is individually rational and \veak1y Pareto eHicient from tbe point of vie-w 
of students is very important to our resulto Since such a proper(y does not hold 
for colleges (See Roth [14}) , we cannot guarantee tbat a symmetric result can be 
reached for colleges. In fact our E..:~ample 6.1 (see Section 6) shon.·s tllat sequential 
e~-tension for the 'lcolleges-propose-and-students-cboose" mechanism u'ell might 
produce unstable SPE allocations. 
6. Final Remarks 
This paper introduces two mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of 
matching markets. The results it provides solve two essential questions. First. 
the core of such games can be implemented in subgame perfect equilibria. And. 
second, it provides simple mechanisms to implement such a solution concepto 
'Ve also provide a mechanism to implement a particular selection of the ~ore! 
namely the students' optimal stable matching. Thus! this paper also provides 
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a positive answer to the implementability of a selection of the eore in matehing 
markets. Notice that Kara and Sonmez [9] prove that no seleetion of the eore can 
be implemented in N ash equilibria. 
Unfortunately a symmetric result cannot be provided fol' the set of eolleges. 
This result points out (as Roth [14] did) the as:yrnmetry holding among both 
sets of the market. l\10reover, we can also state, in the words of Roth~ that "the 
college admissions problem is not equivalent to the m,arriage problem.'~ Note that, 
in the particular case of marriage markets (colleges have only one position each)! 
a symmetrical result for Theorem 5.1 can be stated by exchanging the role of 
students and colleges. 
Let us conclude the paper providing an example to show the asymmetry aboye 
mentioned. 
Example 6.1. Let be {e, Si!:} a three colleges-four students market. Following 
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table summarizes agents preferences. 
{S3, S4} {S4} {S3} e3 e2 e2 e3 
{S2, S4} {S3} {S4} e2 el el el 
{S2,S3} {S2} {SI} el e3 e3 e2 
{SI, S4} {SI} {S2} SI S2 S3 84 
{SI, S3} 0 0 
{SI, S2} 
{S4} 
{S3} 
{S2} 
{SI} 
0 
Let us consider the "colleges-sequentially-propose-and-students-choose~: mech-
anism, (J>CsS. This is a symmetrical version for the mechanism proposed in Section 
5 where colleges are to make proposals in a sequential '\ray. lVe '\rill see that two 
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interesting features which are satisfied by the fami1y of mechanisms ~ssc are nüt 
satisEed by mechanism in ~css. First, some SPE outcame can be unstable rela-
tive ta agents preferences. In order to shaw that, let 115 suppose that the arder in 
'tl-~hich colleges sequentially decide is Cl , C2 and C3' There is a SPE ldth messages 
m(Cl) = {Sl,S2}, m (C2) = {S4}, 1n(c3) = {s3h -ln(sl) = {Cl}1 1n(82) = {Cl}~ 
m(s3) = {C3} and m (S4) = {C2}' Notice that {I>css (1ñ) is unstable because the 
pair { Cl, S3} blocks it. Second1y, the SPE outcomes set depends upon the order in 
which colleges make their decisions. Indeed, let us consider the order for colleges 
in which nrst C2 propases, then C3, and Enally Cl is the last to make a proposal. 
In such a case the unique SPE outcome is J.L (Cl) = {SI, S2}, J.L (C2) = {83} and 
J1 (C3) = {S4}, which is difIerent from the SPE outcome when Erm el is the first 
to play. 
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